We combine a product-quality view of the Linder hypothesis with a proximity-concentration view of …rms'decision about how to serve foreign markets. Our model features non-homothetic preferences for quality and monopolistic competition. As a result, specialization is purely demand-driven and the decision to serve foreign countries via exports or FDI depends on differences in income across countries. We characterize the joint pattern of trade and FDI in a world with multiple countries that di¤er in income and size. We …nd that FDI is more likely to occur between countries with similar per capita income levels, suggesting a Linder e¤ect for FDI. The theory sheds light on some salient features that have been found in the data; in particular, we identify circumstances for the emergence of North-North and South-South multinational enterprises.
Introduction
The Linder hypothesis seeks to explain patterns of international trade. Linder (1961) conjectured that robust local demands for a good induce investments in productive capacity, which in turn give rise to exports. Due to such "home-market e¤ects" (to use the term coined by Krugman, 1980 ), countries will trade intensively with others that share similar consumption patterns. Moreover, to the extent that demands for many goods are non-homothetic, intensive trade between countries that have similar demand structures implies intensive trade between countries that have similar levels of per capita income. Accordingly, Linder o¤ered an early explanation for the high volumes of trade between and among the high-income countries. 1 More recently, Hallak (2010) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) have pursued a "product-quality view" of the Linder hypothesis. This view builds on evidence presented by Schott (2004) and Hummels and Klenow (2005) that richer countries tend to export goods of higher unit value within narrowly de…ned product categories and evidence from Hallak (2006) that exporters disproportionately direct their higher-priced goods to higher-income markets. Also, Bils and Klenow (2001) highlighted a strong positive correlation between household income and the average price paid by the household for goods within product groups. If high unit values are an indication of high quality, then together this evidence suggests a world in which countries with more high-income consumers demand more of the higher quality goods and also specialize in their production. 2 Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) incorporate trade costs into a model in which non-homothetic preferences imply that higher-income groups consume goods of higher average quality to generate predictions about the trade pattern. Their predictions mirror those of the Linder hypothesis. Hallak (2010) presents evidence in keeping with such predictions using industry-level data.
So far, the product-quality approach to the Linder hypothesis, and work related to the Linder hypothesis more generally, has only been concerned with explaining trade patterns. Yet the key forces in these approaches might also be important for understanding global patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI). A prominent view of the determinants of FDI is that …rms' decisions about how to serve foreign markets re ‡ect a "proximity-concentration tradeo¤" (Markusen, 1984) .
In the presence of trading costs, …rms are more likely to serve foreign markets from local production facilities when those markets are large. 3 A product-quality view of the Linder hypothesis suggests that market size will vary with per capita income and product quality, which may therefore in ‡uence 1 Numerous papers have found evidence consistent with the Linder hypothesis, e.g. Thursby and Thursby (1989) , Bergstrand (1990) , Francois and Kaplan (1996) and Fieler (2011) . Markusen (1986) is an early example of a formal theory featuring a form of the Linder e¤ect. In his model, rich capital-abundant countries trade intensely among themselves due to increasing returns to scale and a high income-elasticity of demand for the capital intensive good. 2 Using a methodology that does not rely on unit values as the sole proxy for product quality, Hallak and Schott (2011) also show that richer countries specialize in the production of higher quality goods. 3 By many accounts, market size-along with trading costs and scale economies-is an important determinant of FDI ‡ows and sales by foreign subsidiaries. See, for example, Brainard (1997) the circumstances under which foreign investment is a more likely outcome than international trade.
In this paper we combine a quality view of the Linder hypothesis and a proximity-versusconcentration view of …rms'decision about how to serve foreign markets. We extend the model in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) to allow for a¢ liate sales by multinational corporations. As in our earlier paper, consumers make discrete choices of a horizontally and vertically di¤erentiated product. Each consumer has an idiosyncratic evaluation of each of the available varieties of the di¤erentiated product and some positive fraction of consumers at any income level purchases every available brand. However, preferences are such that the fraction of consumers that opts for one of the higher quality varieties rises with income. It follows that, in equal-sized countries with di¤erent distributions of income, the aggregate demand for the set of higher quality varieties will be greater in the market with more of the high-income consumers. The presence of trading costs generates a home-market e¤ect that governs the pattern of specialization. In this setting, we add an option to serve foreign markets via either exports or subsidiary sales. Firms face a constant per unit cost of exporting and a …xed cost of setting up a foreign production facility, so their choice about how to serve a given market features the familiar proximity-concentration tradeo¤. To study the patterns of trade and FDI that can arise, we need an environment with multiple countries at each level of income. We adopt the simplest such setting, which has two countries in the North and two in the South.
We are interested in understanding the circumstances under which …rms in a country will choose to serve some foreign markets by exports and others by subsidiary sales. We …nd that a systematic bias characterizes the possible equilibrium con…gurations. When the pairs of countries in each region are symmetric, North-to-North FDI or South-to-South FDI must occur in any equilibrium that features multinational investment. Moreover, in our baseline case with equal numbers of consumers in all countries, if the income distribution in each Northern country dominates that in each Southern country, multinationals from the North specialize in producing high-quality products while multinationals from the South specialize in producing low-quality products. This result re ‡ects the combined forces of the home-market e¤ect and the proximity-concentration tradeo¤.
The former implies that countries tend to specialize in goods with large domestic markets. With non-homothetic preferences, these are likely to be higher quality goods in countries with many high-income consumers and lower quality goods in countries with many low-income consumers. The latter implies that …rms are more likely to serve foreign markets via sales of foreign a¢ liates when the destination market is larger. Together, these forces imply that …rms may serve destinations that have a similar demand composition to their home market via FDI and destinations that have a di¤erent demand composition from their home market via export sales. If demand composition comports with the level and distribution of income, then FDI ‡ows may be especially intense among countries that are at a similar stage of development.
In short, the combination of a quality view of the Linder hypothesis and a proximity-versusconcentration view of …rms'decision about how to serve foreign markets delivers a Linder hypothesis for FDI. This prediction …nds support in the evidence presented by Brainard (1997) . She has documented that the share of foreign a¢ liate sales in total sales by U.S. …rms falls with the di¤erence in per capita income between the destination market and that in the United States. In other words, the response of multinational sales to income gaps is more pronounced than that for export sales. 4 In the next section, we provide some additional evidence on the pattern of FDI and the pattern of subsidiary sales. Using data for a broad sample of countries, we show that both the volume of subsidiary sales and the stock of FDI originating in some country and destined for another are negatively related to the di¤erence in per capita income between the pair, after controlling for …xed e¤ects in the origin and destination countries and the geographic distance between them. Our model might also help us to understand the recent rise in South-to-South FDI. 5 For example, the Boston Consulting Group (2006) has reported that 28 of the largest 100 Southern multinationals have been motivated to invest abroad in order to "tak[e] their established home-market product lines and brands to global markets."These …rms, which are concentrated in consumer durables such as electronics and household appliances, produce goods for which arguably there are substantial quality di¤erences between output in the North and the South, and, with their lower unit values, they can target a clientele that is not too di¤erent from that in their native market.
A vast literature before us has studied the determinants of foreign direct investment. What distinguishes our theory is its emphasis on explaining a bias in FDI towards countries at a similar stage of development. Having more than one product for which FDI may occur as well as multiple countries is critical for this result: FDI turns out to be more likely across similar-income countries because these countries endogenously specialize in similar-quality products. A literature on "vertical" FDI, emanating from Helpman (1984) , studies …rms' decision to break down stages of production that di¤er in factor intensity across locations that di¤er in factor prices. Naturally, this strand is ill-suited to generate the equilibrium bias in FDI that we …nd. On the other hand, Markusen and Venables (2000) extend the Helpman and Krugman (1985) set-up with trade costs to allow for a proximity-concentration tradeo¤. Theirs is a Hecksher-Ohlin model with two countries, where increasing returns to scale and FDI are allowed in only one industry. Their theory predicts that FDI is more likely to arise the more similar are the factor endowments of the two countries, but they are unable to distinguish between regional or cross-regional FDI. Finally, recent multicountry Ricardian models that feature the proximity-concentration tradeo¤, such as Helpman et al.
(2004) and Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009), are able to generate regional FDI, but present no systematic bias in favor of North-to-North or South-to-South ‡ows or endogenous specialization in di¤erent products. In these environments, FDI predominantly ‡ows from countries that host more productive …rms to countries that have relatively larger markets. 6 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present some simple, motivating evidence. We display the average income of the destination country for FDI and for 4 Carr et al. (2001) show that convergence in GDP between the United States and any host country tends to increase a¢ liate sales in both directions. 5 Whereas only 15% of foreign investment ‡ows to developing countries emanated from the South in 1995, Aykut and Ratha (2004) report that almost 40% of such ‡ows now have origins in the other emerging markets. 6 Institutional similarities among developing countries have also been proposed as an explanation for the recent surge in South-South FDI. See Dixit (2011) . subsidiary sales of a broad range of source countries, and we show how these ‡ows correlate with the absolute value of the di¤erence in per capita income between origin and destination markets. In Section 3, we present our multi-country model of trade that includes non-homothetic preferences, monopolistic competition, and the proximity-versus-concentration tradeo¤. In Section 4, we …nd conditions for FDI in a given product across country-pairs, taking as given the market size for that product in each country. We show that there is a bias towards FDI ‡ows between countries with similarly sized markets for goods of a given quality level. Section 5 characterizes the global pattern of specialization and FDI in goods with di¤erent quality when countries di¤er in their income distributions and number of consumers. We present parameter con…gurations that give rise to Northern multinationals in high-quality goods and Southern multinationals in low-quality products. Section 6 concludes.
2 Some Motivating Evidence on Bilateral Patterns of FDI Ramondo (2011) has assembled data on revenues from sales in country j by foreign a¢ liates of …rms based in country i, on accumulated stocks of foreign investment, and on other variables relating to bilateral FDI and foreign a¢ liate activity for 151 countries at di¤erent levels of development for the period from 1990 to 2002. We use these data to develop some motivating facts about the patterns of FDI and subsidiary sales. We are particularly interested in how these bilateral relationships re ‡ect the similarity or di¤erence in the per capita levels of the source and destination countries. 7 In Figure 1 , we plot on the horizontal axis the log of the average per capita income during the 1990's for the 129 (source) countries in the Ramondo data set that report positive stocks of outward FDI during the period. On the vertical axis we plot the log of the weighted average per capita income in the destination countries for this accumulated FDI, where the weights are the shares of each of the destination countries in the total stock of FDI originating in the particular source country. The …gure shows clearly that …rms based in rich countries tend to locate their foreign a¢ liates in richer destination markets than do …rms based in poor countries. 8 For example, the average per capita income in destination countries for FDI originating in the United States, France and Japan was $17,717, $22,108, and $19,396, respectively, whereas for Chile, India and Russia it was $7025, $8419 and $11,882. Meanwhile, Kenya and Nigeria directed their FDI to countries with weighted average per capita incomes of $570 and $2398, respectively. Table 1 shows the results from a regression of the log of the average stock of bilateral FDI during the period from 1990 to 2000 on the absolute value of the log di¤erence in per capita income between the origin and destination countries, the log of the geographic distance between the origin 7 We are grateful to Natalia Ramondo for sharing these data with us and for advising us on details of how they were constructed. 8 In a similar vein, the UNCTAD (2006) reports data on the FDI ‡ows emanating from developing countries.They documents a negative correlation between GDP per capita and the share of developing economies in total FDI in ‡ows. The patterns revealed by the Ramondo data on FDI and a¢ liate sales, along with the earlier evidence for the United States provided by Brainard (1997) suggest that …rms are more likely to serve via FDI those foreign markets that have similar per capita income to their home market compared to markets that have very di¤erent levels of per capita income. We now present a model of FDI featuring non-homothetic preferences for goods of di¤erent quality to explain why this might be so.
The Model
We study a world economy comprising four countries, two in the North and two in the South.
We index the countries by k 2 fR 1 ; R 2 ; P 1 ; P 2 g. The pair of Northern countries, R 1 and R 2 , have higher per capita incomes than do the pair of Southern countries, P 1 and P 2 . We include four countries in our model in order to study foreign direct investment within and across levels of we adopt a symmetric geography in which it is equally costly to ship goods between any pair of countries.
Each country is populated by a continuum of households. A household is endowed with one unit of labor of some productivity. We take the distribution of labor productivity in each country as given and denote by G k (y) the fraction of households in country k that has productivity less than or equal to y. Let N k be the measure of households residing in country k, so that N k R ydG k (y) is the aggregate supply of e¤ective labor there.
Supply
In every country, competitive …rms can produce a homogeneous, numeraire good with one unit of e¤ective labor per unit of output. This good can be shipped internationally at zero cost. Labor supplies are such that every country produces the numeraire good in positive quantity. This pins down the common, global wage for e¤ective labor and it implies that a household with y units of e¤ective labor has a labor income of y. Since there are no pro…ts in the equilibria that we study,
gives the distribution of income in country k.
Agents in any country can access a common technology for producing a set of di¤erentiated products. These goods can be produced in two di¤erent quality levels, H and L, with H > L.
At each quality level, the market delivers a discrete (and endogenous) number of horizontallydi¤erentiated varieties. In order to produce a good of quality q, a …rm must bear a …xed cost of f q (i.e., it needs to hire f q units of e¤ective labor) and a variable cost of c q per unit of output, with 
Demand
Each household demands exactly one unit of some variety of the di¤erentiated product. A household h that consumes z units of the homogenous good and chooses variety j 2 J q of the di¤erentiated product achieves utility
where " h j is the household's idiosyncratic evaluation of the attributes of that variety. Each household has a vector " h = n " h j o of such taste parameters. A household maximizes utility by making a discrete choice of some particular variety in some quality segment and by spending its residual income on the homogeneous good. We assume that, in every country, even the household with the least income can a¤ord to purchase the most expensive brand of the di¤erentiated product.
In every country, the vectors " h are distributed independently across households according to the Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution,
In Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), we discussed how aggregate demands are derived from these preferences, given a set of prices
for all products sold in country k; in so doing, we followed the methods developed by McFadden (1978) and others. As is well known from the literature on discrete choice, the GEV distribution of the taste parameter implies that
where k j (y) is the fraction of households with income y that chooses variety j in country k at the given prices. Variation in the spending pattern across income groups in a country arises solely from variation in the fraction of individuals who purchase the products at di¤erent levels of quality q, as re ‡ected by the functions k j (y). As shown in Fajgelbaum et al. (2009) , the fraction of individuals who purchase high-quality products rises with income at all income levels. Aggregate demands for any product are found by integrating the sales over all income groups, so that
where d k j is the demand for brand j 2 J q in country k. The reader will recognize (2) as a nested logit system of aggregate demands.
Pricing and Pro…ts
Each …rm that produces some variety of the di¤erentiated product sells its output to consumers worldwide. The …rm can choose di¤erent prices in each market although in fact it has no incentive to discriminate in its f.o.b. prices. A …rm that produces a variety j 2 J q in country k faces aggregate demand d k j in its home market and a unit cost of c q . We assume that the number of active producers in each quality segment is large and that monopolistic competition prevails. As is common in settings with monopolistic competition, the fact that there are many competitors means that …rms can ignore the in ‡uence of their own price decisions on the terms in the various sums in (2). As we have shown in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) , the pro…t-maximizing price for local sales entails a …xed markup q =q over marginal cost.
Each …rm in country k serves the foreign market in another country k 0 either with exports or with goods produced in a subsidiary there, but not both. Firms with subsidiaries in k 0 face the same demand and cost conditions as local producers, so they too price at a markup q =q over their unit cost of c q : Firms that export to country k 0 face a higher cost per sale of c q + q that includes a shipping charge. So, they price at a markup q =q over this higher, delivered cost. In short, households in any country k face at most two prices for the varieties in J q , the price p d q that is charged for all locally-produced goods and the price p m q that is attached to imports. These prices are common across countries and given by
The markups vary positively with the "dissimilarity"parameter q for goods in J q and negatively with the quality level itself. A high value for q implies that goods in J q are imperfect substitutes in aggregate demand, in the sense that the idiosyncratic tastes for any pair of these goods are little correlated. This makes for an inelastic demand for a given variety and thus a large markup. The direct e¤ect of quality is to raise households'marginal utility of spending on the homogeneous good, which makes them more sensitive to prices and thus induces a lower markup. Taken together, these considerations imply a higher markup for high-quality products than for low-quality goods if and
Sales of locally-produced goods of quality q in country k (be they domestic brands or those of foreign subsidiaries) re ‡ect the prices of these goods, the prices of competing imports, and the numbers of locally-produced and imported varieties at each quality level. Let d k q represent the aggregate demand by domestic consumers for a typical good of quality q produced in country k by a domestic …rm or by a foreign subsidiary, when all goods are priced according to (3) . Then the demand function (2) implies
n k q is the number of varieties of goods of quality q produced in country k, n includes exporters from as many as three source countries and similarly, the number n s;k q includes FDI in k from as many as three parent countries. We refer toñ k q as the "e¤ective" number of competitors in the market segment for quality q in country k, after taking into account the equilibrium pricing induced by the positive transport costs; i.e., after appropriately discounting the number of imported varieties.
All …rms that produce a variety with quality q earn the same variable pro…ts of q =q per unit sold. A domestic …rm in country k makes local sales of d k q and pays no "extra" …xed costs. Its variable pro…ts in its home market are the product of its sales and the mark-up. A foreign …rm with a subsidiary in k makes these same sales, but pays a …xed cost for its foreign plants of h q .
Its pro…ts in the market are those of the domestic …rm less the …xed cost of the subsidiary. An exporter to country k bears no extra …xed cost for selling there, but its sales in country k are only q times as large as those of a typical, local producer. Thus, we can express pro…ts from sales in country k by a domestic …rm, by a local subsidiary of a foreign …rm, and by a foreign exporter, respectively, as
Of course, each foreign …rm chooses its mode for serving market k by comparing potential pro…ts from exporting
x;k q with potential pro…ts from subsidiary sales, s;k q ; a …rm that produces a variety with quality q engages in FDI in country k if
q , and it is indi¤erent otherwise. The maximum global pro…t attainable by a …rm with headquarters in countrỳ that produces a brand with quality q is
We assume that there is free entry into the market for di¤erentiated products, so that q = 0 in an equilibrium in which a positive number of …rms that produce goods with quality q are headquartered in country`, and q 0 in an equilibrium in which no …rms that produce goods with this quality are headquartered there. 9 
Equilibrium
To summarize, an equilibrium in our model consists of (local) market potentials d k q for each market k 2 fR 1 ; R 2 ; P 1 ; P 2 g and product quality q 2 fH; Lg, numbers of domestic producers n n (ii) given market potentials d k q , the export versus FDI decisions of all …rms are optimal; i.e., (iii) and given market potentials d k q , the numbers of entrants in each market and market segment are consistent with free entry; i.e.,
The "market potential"d k q measures the number of sales that a local producer of some variety with quality q could capture in country k, considering the number and location of its competitors, the optimal pricing decision by the …rm and all its rivals, and the overall size of the market.
In what follows, we consider …rst a world economy in which R 1 and R 2 are a pair of symmetric countries and P 1 and P 2 also are symmetric. In other words, we suppose that each region comprises two countries that are identical in all relevant respects. We do allow the distribution of income and the population size to di¤er between North and South. For the case of symmetric countries within each region, we can drop the subscripts 1 and 2 from the countries and use R to indicate a typical (rich) country in the North and P to indicate a typical (poor) country in the South. With this notation in place, the net pro…ts of a …rm headquartered in country k that produces a brand of quality q can be written as
for q = H; L, k;`= R; P and`6 = k: Following our analysis of the symmetric case in the next two sections, we shall discuss some consequences of asymmetries between the countries in a region.
Place of Entry and Conditions for FDI
We are interested in where …rms enter in each quality segment and how the active producers choose to serve their various foreign markets. In this section, we will focus on the pro…tability conditions that determine the place of entry and mode of organization. We will ask, What combinations of market potentials, d R q and d P q ; are consistent with zero pro…ts for active …rms, non-positive pro…ts for potential entrants, and optimal organization of production by all …rms? In other words, we will identify the combinations of d R q and d P q that satisfy the requirements (ii) and (iii) in the de…nition of an equilibrium that we gave in Section 3.4, without considering for the time being which ones are also consistent with the demand system, as stipulated in requirement (i). In so doing, we are able to establish and explain a general bias in favor of North-to-North and South-to-South multinationals. In the next section, we will impose requirement (i) in order to fully characterize the general equilibrium.
Let us focus on the market for di¤erentiated products with quality q and omit the subscript q whenever it causes no confusion to do so. We de…ne two magnitudes that will be important in the discussion. First, let x be the volume of sales that a …rm would need to make in order to cover its …xed cost of entry. Inasmuch as …rms make the same pro…t =q on every sale in any of the four markets, it follows that x = f q= . Second, let x s be the volume of sales that a …rm must make in some foreign market in order to cover the cost of operating a subsidiary there. Then x s = hq= .
Note that both x and x s are derived parameters; i.e., they do not depend on any of the equilibrium interactions in the model. Using these de…nitions, we can represent the net pro…ts of a …rm as given in (6) more compactly
for k;`= R; P and`6 = k; where d k are the sales in country k of a typical product manufactured locally and d k are the sales of an imported product. Clearly, the choice between exporting to a foreign market and opening a subsidiary is governed by a comparison of d k and d k x s ; a non-local …rm will serve the market in country k by exports if d k < x s = (1 ) and by subsidiary sales if the opposite inequality holds. In other words, large markets are served by foreign subsidiaries to avoid the substantial shipping costs that would result from trade, whereas smaller markets are served by exports because the potential cost savings from local delivery cannot justify the cost of investment in a local plant. Also, the break-even condition for …rms headquartered in country k requires that
for k;`= R; P and`6 = k; if the left-hand side of (7) falls short of x, then no …rms will enter in country k in the relevant market segment.
Considering the symmetry that we have introduced, there are four possible outcomes for a …rm's choice of how to serve its foreign markets. At one extreme, a …rm headquartered in some country may choose to supply all foreign markets as an exporter. At the opposite extreme, the …rm might elect to establish foreign subsidiaries in all markets; we shall refer to such a …rm as a global multinational. We are, however, most interested in the conditions that give rise to the intermediate outcomes, in which a …rm serves some markets with exports and others by subsidiary sales. We refer to a …rm that operates a subsidiary in the other country in its own region but exports to the two markets in the opposite region as a regional multinational. A …rm that exports to the other market in its own region but operates subsidiaries in the opposite region is a cross-regional multinational.
We now begin to identify the combinations of d R and d P that are consistent with entry in either region (or both) and with the various organizational choices. We start with the cross-regional multinationals, for which the conditions are most restrictive. Suppose that a …rm headquartered in country k exports to country k 0 in its own region, but operates a subsidiary in the two countries`and 0 in the opposite region. Exports from k to k 0 can be optimal for the …rm only if d k x s = (1 ).
Moreover, the …rm breaks even only if
Of course, there can be no pure-pro…t opportunities for a …rm that might enter in the same quality segment in country`and operate as a regional multinational from there, which implies that
Together, (8) and (9) imply that d k x s = (1 ). Therefore, a …rm might enter in country k and operate as a cross-regional multinational only if d k = x s = (1 ). The presence of crossregional multinationals based in country k also requires that d` x s = (1 ), because otherwise the …rm would prefer to export to the two markets in the opposite region. In short, cross-regional multinationals can emerge only in one of the smaller markets, and then only for a very particular value of the market potential there.
As we turn to the other organizational forms, we will distinguish three cases based on the relative size of the …xed cost of operating a foreign subsidiary compared to the …xed cost of entering the market. Note that x s =x = h=f . We say that the relative cost of FDI is prohibitive if x s =x > Notice that at point C,
. Point C lies on the two curves representing the zero-pro…t conditions for exporters in each region; i.e., at point C
and
so that d R = d P = x= (1 + 3 ). The fact that, at point C, each market potential is less than At point B, a Northern …rm would be indi¤erent between exporting to the other regional market or operating a subsidiary there. At this point, both of these modes yield the same pro…ts and either could be consistent with the equilibrium requirements. The segment AB represents combinations of d R and d P for which a regional multinational headquartered in the North makes zero pro…ts;
i.e., In the interior of this segment, Northern …rms strictly prefer to export to the South but also strictly prefer to operate a subsidiary in the regional market that is not their own. Moreover, if the market potentials are such that regional multinationals break even in the North, there will be no pro…table entry opportunity for any type of …rm in the South. The segment DE has similar properties, except that the regional multinationals would be headquartered in the South instead of the North. We turn to Figure 4 , which depicts the case of a low relative cost of FDI. Again, the solid line segment indicates that …rms are active only in the North, whereas the broken segment indicates that …rms are active only in the South. Here, there is also a dotted-and-dashed segment, which is meant to suggest that producers may operate pro…tably with headquarters located anywhere in the world.
Consider …rst point C, where the market potentials in the two regions are the same. At this
, so no matter where a …rm is headquartered, it prefers to open a subsidiary in each of its three foreign markets than to export from the home plant to any of them.
All …rms operate as global multinationals, and entry is equally pro…table in any location. But notice, now, that the same is true all along the segment BC. As long as the market potential in every country exceeds x s = (1 ), all active …rms choose to be global multinationals. And global multinationals make the same sales, earn the same revenues and pay the same …xed and variable costs irrespective of their country of origin.
The segment AB in Figure 4 represents combinations of d R and d P that give rise to regional multinationals with their headquarters in the North, while the segment DE represents combinations for which there are regional multinationals headquartered in the South. In either case, the market potential in a …rm's regional foreign market exceeds the critical value that makes FDI pro…table, but the market potentials in the countries of the opposite region do not. In other words, segment AB has North-to-North FDI, while segment DE has South-to-South FDI, but neither segment has FDI that cross regional boundaries.
We summarize our …ndings in
, there is FDI for products of quality q. Either these goods are produced in the North and in the South and all …rms engage in global FDI, or one region specializes in producing products of quality q. In the latter case, every …rm serves the other country in its region with subsidiary sales while exporting to the countries in the opposite region.
, there is international trade but no FDI in products of quality q. Production may take place in one or both regions, but in either case producers export to all foreign markets.
, there is international trade in products of quality q. FDI can occur only when production takes place in a single region, and then every producer serves the country in its region with subsidiary sales while exporting to the countries in the opposite region.
The proposition immediately implies
Corollary 1 If FDI takes place for products of quality q, then there must be either North-to-North FDI or South-to-South FDI.
This corollary can help to explain the prevalence of multinational investment between and among the industrialized countries, as well as perhaps the recent dramatic rise of Southern multinationals operating in other developing countries. In terms of our model, the intuition is straightforward. In a world of costly trade and foreign investment, …rms tend to enter into the larger markets. But with non-homothetic demands for vertically di¤erentiated products, the large markets for a good of a given quality are likely to be found in countries that stand at similar levels of development.
Moreover, the proximity-concentration tradeo¤ implies that …rms prefer to serve large foreign markets with FDI and small markets with exports. It follows that regional FDI often will be more attractive to …rms than cross-regional FDI.
Patterns of Trade and FDI
In Section 4, we identi…ed the combinations of d R and d P that are consistent with free entry and optimal choices of exporting versus FDI by all …rms. Now we need to reintroduce the connection between the numbers and organizational choices of …rms in each location and the sales that result from optimal pricing in order to pin down the equilibrium values of d R and d P in each market segment. In so doing, we can link the global patterns of FDI and trade to cost parameters, income distributions, and population sizes, which are the fundamental determinants of trade and FDI in our model. In all that follows, we assume that the typical country in the North is richer than the typical country in the South, in the sense that G R (y) …rst-order stochastically dominates G P (y).
Fixed Costs of Foreign Direct Investment
We begin by examining the cost of foreign investment, which is captured in our model by the parameters h H and h L . For purposes of this exercise, we will assume that all countries have the same population size, N . We will examine the consequences of a reduction in the …xed cost of FDI in one quality segment while holding that in the other segment constant.
Suppose that the …xed cost of FDI is prohibitive in both quality segments, using the terminology introduced in Section 4; that is, h q =f q > (1 q ) = (1 + q ) for q = H; L. As we have noted, no multinational investment can arise in such circumstances and the equilibrium features exporting by all …rms. The trade patterns can be found by extending the reasoning developed in Fajgelbaum et al. (2010). As we noted there, several subcases can arise. If shipping costs are high enough, they can a¤ord enough protection to support positive production of both low-quality and high-quality goods in every country. A similar outcome arises for any given set of shipping costs if the income distributions of the two regions are su¢ ciently close. If shipping costs instead are low, or the income distributions of the two regions are far apart, each good will be produced in only one region. In such circumstances, the home-market e¤ect renders entry in the smaller markets unpro…table. It is also possible that equilibrium production in one quality segment will be diversi…ed globally while production in the other segment is concentrated in one region.
For the time being, let us examine the case in which, in the absence of any multinational investment, production of goods at each quality level takes place in only one region. The arguments from Fajgelbaum et al. (2010) readily extend to our setting with two symmetric countries in each region. They imply that goods of quality H are produced in the countries that have the larger markets for these goods which, with equal populations and the speci…ed di¤erences in income distribution, must be the richer countries, R 1 and R 2 . Similarly, when the …xed costs of FDI are prohibitive, the goods of quality L are produced in P 1 and P 2 . In terms of our Figure 2 , the discussion in Fajgelbaum et al. (2010) indicates that the equilibrium in the market for high-quality goods falls somewhere along the segment BC, where d R H > d P H . Meanwhile, the equilibrium in the market for low-quality goods lies somewhere along CD, where
The Northern countries export high-quality products to the South and the Southern countries export low-quality products to the North, with balanced trade between the countries in the same region. Now suppose that the …xed cost of FDI falls for high-quality goods, and with it the minimum scale for a pro…table subsidiary. As long as h H remains su¢ ciently large that
H of the trade-only equilibrium, then no …rm has any incentive to change its mode of delivery or its prices. The equilibrium continues to feature exports as the sole means of delivery.
Once h H falls to a level at which this inequality no longer is satis…ed at the initial d R H , then FDI becomes an attractive alternative to exporting for some …rms in the North. Let h H be such
Then …rms that produce high-quality goods in the North are indi¤erent between serving the foreign market in their region with exports or by establishing a local presence there. In Figure 3 , the equilibrium now is at a point such as B in the market for highquality goods, and along CD in the market for low-quality goods. Initially (i.e., for the greatest value of h H such that x s H = (1 H ) d R H ) the equilibrium continues to have only exporting and no FDI. We can see that regional multinationals must emerge in the North as the …xed cost of FDI falls from that level. In this circumstance, the trade-only equilibrium is no longer sustainable
Furthermore, as long as the fall in h H is not too large the economy must still be in a situation such as the one depicted in Figure 3 ( i.e., where the relative cost of FDI is high according to our de…nition). Therefore, an equilibrium with regional multinationals turns out to be the only feasible outcome in this situation.
Note, further, that the equality x s H = (1 H ) d R H must continue to hold for some range of values of h H . Otherwise, in the absence of any additional adjustments, the opening of a foreign subsidiary would be attractive to all Northern …rms. But this would create a discontinuous response in the equilibrium, which cannot happen in our setting. Instead, some fraction of the Northern …rms opts to establish a subsidiary in the opposite country of the North, while the remaining …rms continue to export. The total number of …rms and the fraction in each category adjust so that
As h H continues to decline, the fraction of Northern …rms that chooses to serve the other market in the North with subsidiary sales grows, until all such Northern …rms operate in this manner. Thereafter, it is no longer possible for the market potentials to adjust so as to keep the Northern …rms in a state of indi¤erence. The equilibrium eventually has
, with all Northern …rms operating as regional multinationals, as represented by a point along AB in Figure 3 . 11 Still further declines in the …xed cost of FDI will bring us to a situation like that depicted in Figure 4 . Suppose the equilibrium for high-quality goods ends up on a segment such as BD in that …gure. Note that in the limit, as h H approaches zero, such an outcome is inevitable. When 1 1 In the above considered case, in which North manufactures high-quality products and South manufactures lowquality products, the equilibrium falls along the segment BD, every …rm producing some variety of a high-quality product strictly prefers to serve all of its foreign markets via FDI; i.e., all producers of high-quality goods operate as global multinationals. In such circumstances, the break-even condition for an active producer becomes
irrespective of whether a …rm is headquartered in the North or the South. Then, the distribution of …rms across countries is not determined, although the total number of producers is unique.
We have described the possible outcomes that arise for di¤erent relative costs of FDI h H =f H when trade costs and income distributions are such that the trade-only equilibrium has production of high-quality goods only in the North and production of low-quality goods only in the South.
Using similar reasoning, we can also identify the equilibria that arise for di¤erent relative costs of FDI when the production of both quality levels is globally diversi…ed in the trade-only equilibrium, i.e. when shipping costs are large or regional di¤erences in income distributions are small. In such circumstances, we know from (10) and (11) that d k H = x H = (1 + 3 ) for k = R; P in the equilibrium with prohibitive costs of FDI. As before, let us reduce h H while holding h L at a prohibitive level.
Naturally, the trade-only equilibrium with diversi…ed production remains in place as long as h H is above the largest h H such that
At that exact point, we have that producers of high-quality goods are indi¤erent between all four organizational forms, including the possibility of cross-regional multinationals. For values of h H below that threshold, the market for high-quality goods must be characterized by what we have termed a low relative cost of FDI. Then, we may have either global multinationals producing high-quality goods or regional multinationals operating only in the North. When the trade-only equilibrium displays globally diversi…ed production, even "high" relative costs of FDI turn out to be prohibitive.
In sum, we have established Of course, the same reasoning applies to reductions in h L from an initially prohibitive level when the …xed cost of FDI in the high-quality segment remains prohibitive throughout. Then, if the trade-only equilibrium features complete regional specialization in both quality segments, regional multinationals will appear in the South, …rst as a fraction of all Southern …rms and eventually as a dominant means for Southern …rms to serve their other, large market. When h H and h L are both su¢ ciently small, the equilibrium can be one in which all …rms operate as regional multinationals, serving their larger foreign market (in the same region) from a foreign subsidiary, while exporting to the smaller markets in the opposite regions.
In the remainder of this section, let us be a little more precise about the formal conditions under which the various types of equilibria can arise. Suppose we conjecture that the equilibrium has global multinationals in both market segments. As we have just noted, such multinationals-when they exist-can operate from any home country. We can use (4) for d k q to express the break-even condition for a global multinational as
where n q is the total number of products of quality q available in every market. The arguments from Fajgelbaum et al. (2010) establish that these two equations have a unique solution for n L and n H , which has n L > 0 and n H > 0. But the solution for n L and n H may not be consistent with an equilibrium on the segment BD in both the market for low-quality and high-quality products, as we have just conjectured. In fact, this requires that demands and income distributions be such
as well as the condition for low costs of FDI introduced in Section 4. If the parameters and market potentials do not fall in these ranges, then our conjecture that an equilibrium exists with global multinationals cannot be justi…ed.
Similarly, we can search for an equilibrium with concentrated production of high-quality goods in the North and concentrated production of low-quality goods in the South, and with regional multinationals operating in both places. We can use (4) to write the break-even conditions for the active producers as
where, as before, n q is the total number of varieties with quality q produced in the world economy.
Here, the distribution of production of the high-quality goods across the two Northern countries is not determined, nor is the distribution of production of low-quality goods across the two Southern countries. The solution to this pair of equations characterizes an equilibrium provided that the implied market potentials are consistent with the assume behavior of …rms, i.e., that
where (14) ensures that …rms prefer to export to the markets in the opposite region than to establish subsidiaries there and (15) ensures that …rms prefer to operate as regional multinationals than as exporters or as global multinationals. In addition, we need the condition for high costs of FDI introduced in Section 4.
The discussion in this section points to two broad conclusions. First, we see that home-market e¤ects tend to drive the production of high-quality goods to the North and the production of low-quality goods to the South. These patterns of specialization can be partial or complete. Our analysis in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) established such predictions in a world with trade as the only vehicle for foreign sales, but we see now that they apply as well when multinational investment is possible. The costliness of trade and FDI give an advantage to …rms that enjoy a large home market. Once biased entry occurs, these …rms will serve (some or all) foreign markets with exports when transport costs are small relative to the costs of establishing foreign subsidiaries and will serve these markets with subsidiary sales when the opposite is true.
Second, we …nd that the proximity-concentration tradeo¤ biases the pattern of delivery toward a preponderance of within-region FDI compared to cross-region FDI. Firms opt for subsidiaries over exports when serving larger markets. If demands patterns are more similar within regions than across regions, then having a large market at home tends to go hand in hand with having a large market in other countries at a similar level of development. These forces imply that regional multinationals are more likely to arise when di¤erences in per capita income between regions are large and the relative cost of FDI lies in some intermediate range. When the two regions have su¢ ciently similar income distributions, global multinationals dominate regional FDI.
Since our model features trade and FDI in …nal consumer goods, it implies that trade and FDI are substitutes; when a …rm chooses to serve a foreign market via subsidiary sales it does not export 
North-South Income Gaps
We explore next how di¤erences in per capita income in ‡uence the pattern of trade and investment.
We begin with a case with high costs of FDI, as in Figure 3 , and a negligible di¤erence in income between North and South. As we have shown in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) , a small income gap gives rise to a trade equilibrium with production of low and high quality goods in all countries.
The initial equilibrium is at a point such as C in Figure 3 for both the high-quality segment and the low-quality segment. The two Northern countries are net exporters of the high-quality goods to the countries in the South, while the Southern countries are net exporters of the low-quality goods in their trade with the North. Trade between countries in the same region is balanced in each quality segment.
Now let the North-South income gap grow, while keeping aggregate world income constant. The market for high-quality goods expands in the North, while that for low-quality goods expands in the South. At some point, these di¤erences in market size grow su¢ ciently large that production of low-quality goods cannot be sustained in the North, nor can production of high-quality goods occur in the South. With specialization by region, the equilibrium in the high-quality segment occurs at a point along BC in Figure 3 , whereas that for the low-quality segment occurs along CD. A still greater widening of the income gap can make FDI attractive for regional sales. For example, the equilibrium in the market for low-quality goods can reach a point such as D, where Southern …rms are indi¤erent between serving the other Southern market with exports or from a foreign subsidiary. Finally, for a su¢ ciently large income gap, the equilibrium can have all …rms in one or both quality segments operating as regional multinationals. represents the number of …rms that operate as exporters of low-quality goods in the typical Southern country while n s;P L is the number of regional multinationals with foreign subsidiaries producing low-quality goods in the South. 13 The …gure shows that all countries produce in both quality segments when the income gap is small. Also, for small di¤erences in mean income, all markets are served by exports. In this example, producers of high-quality goods do not operate foreign subsidiaries for any of the mean income di¤erences shown in the …gure. As the income gap widens, the number of high-quality brands produced in the North rises, while that in the South falls, until the latter eventually declines to zero. For a large enough di¤erence in mean income, the home-market advantage of the North in high-quality products spells an end to production in the South.
A widening of the income gap also leads to greater specialization in the market for low-quality goods. As the gap grows, the size of the market for low-quality products grows in the South and shrinks in the North. Correspondingly, the number of low-quality products produced by Southern …rms expands and the number of such products produced by Northern …rms shrinks. Once production of low-quality disappears in the North, further increases in the income gap eventually generate a change in the mode of delivery by Southern …rms. Regional multinationals spring into existence in the South and initially coexist with Southern …rms that operate solely as exporters. There is a range of income di¤erences for which regional multinationals and exporters coexist in the market for low-quality goods, corresponding to an equilibrium at point D in Figure 3 . When the income Next consider a case with low …xed costs of FDI, such as is depicted in Figure 4 . When the North-South income gap is tiny, the markets for a given quality of good are almost the same size in the four countries. The equilibrium features global multinationals that could be headquartered anywhere. Then, as the income gap grows, the equilibrium in the market for high-quality goods moves toward point B in Figure 4 , while that in the market for low-quality goods moves toward point D. At point B, both global multinationals (located anywhere) and regional multinationals in the North earn zero pro…ts producing high-quality goods, so both types of …rms can coexist.
At point D, regional multinationals in the South and global multinationals break even producing low-quality goods. For large enough di¤erences in mean income levels, the high-quality segment has an equilibrium along AB, with regional (North-to-North) multinationals operating in the North, and no production in the South. Similarly, the low-quality segment has an equilibrium along DE, with regional (South-to-South) multinationals operating in the South, and no production in the North. Figure 6 depicts a parameterized example of this. 14 In this example, the relative cost of FDI is low in both quality segments. The example con…rms the presence of global multinationals for small and moderate di¤erences in mean incomes. As we have noted previously, the model does not determine where these …rms are headquartered, but nor does that outcome matter for any of the aggregate variables. As the di¤erence in mean income grows, the structure of the market for low-quality products evolves. South. But the equilibrium has, as well, a determinate number of regional multinationals that must be headquartered in the South; this number is depicted by the dotted curve, n s;P L , where the superscripts indicate that these are regional subsidiaries involving South-to-South FDI. This number expands as the income gap widens, until eventually these regional multinationals replace the global multinationals entirely.
Market Size
In this section, we examine the relationship between overall market size and patterns of trade and FDI. We capture market size in a country by the parameter N k , which represents the number of households that purchases a unit of some variety of di¤erentiated product. In general, an increase in market size in a country or region tends to provide absolute advantages across all di¤erentiated goods thanks to the home-market e¤ect. The advantage of rich countries in the high-quality segment grows even larger when the overall size of the market for di¤erentiated products expands relative to that in the South. Moreover, when Northern markets are larger than Southern markets, …rms in the North may begin to capture world markets for low-quality goods as well. As before, we are specially concerned with …nding conditions for the emergence of regional multinationals. We explore both di¤erences in size between North and South and asymmetries in size between the two countries in a given region.
We begin with the case in which the pair of countries that comprise a region are similar in size, but each country in the North is bigger than its counterpart in the South. We will start from a con…guration similar to that in the last section, where market sizes are identical across the four countries but only income distributions di¤er. From that starting point, we will examine the implications of an increase in market size in the North. Take …rst the case in which the …xed cost of FDI is high according to our previous taxonomy, so that Figure 3 applies. With reasonably high shipping costs or su¢ ciently close income distributions, goods of both quality levels are produced in all four countries. The equilibrium is at point C in both quality segments. As N R increases, the size of the market expands in the North in all quality segments. 15 The analysis in Fajgelbaum et. al.
(2011) indicates that, for a su¢ ciently large N R , production of all di¤erentiated products migrates to the North. In that case, the equilibrium lies on segment BC of Figure 3 for both quality segments, but multinational investment does not occur. The North produces all di¤erentiated products and the South specializes in the homogenous good.
Further increases in N R drive the trade-only equilibrium in both quality segments towards point B in Figure 3 . Suppose that the equilibrium reaches this point …rst in the high-quality segment. In such circumstances, the market size in each Northern country is so large that Northern …rms are indi¤erent between serving the other country in the same region via subsidiaries sales or exports.
Reasoning as in the previous section, we can infer that for a su¢ ciently large N R the equilibrium must lie along segment AB. A similar logic applies to low-quality goods. Therefore, for su¢ ciently large di¤erences in market size between the two regions, regional multinationals emerge in the 1 5 Note, from the de…nition of d k j in (2) , that N k is part of the market potential in k.
larger region, and they might do so in both quality segments. A similar logic applies when we start from a case of low costs of FDI. Under such conditions, when we start from a situation of very similarly-sized countries, we have global multinationals in both quality segments. As N R grows, demands slide across BC towards the AB segment of Figure 4 , whereupon regional multinationals emerge.
In summary, asymmetries in market size between regions drive …rms operating in both quality segments toward the larger region. When the di¤erence in size between regions is su¢ ciently great, regional multinationals emerge in the larger region. The logic underlying this outcome is common to the case of both high and low costs of FDI. As the size of countries in one region increases, there is necessarily entry of new …rms in both quality segments. In the case of high costs of FDI, these are exporters who tend to be headquartered in the largest region, while in the case of low cost of FDI they are global multinationals that can be headquartered anywhere in the world. This worldwide increase in the number of …rms necessarily increases competition in the region whose market size is not growing, driving down market potentials. When the number of consumers becomes su¢ ciently large in the expanding region, the size of the market in the other region is too small for …rms headquartered there to break even. In the limit, as the number of …rms keeps rising, market potentials approximate zero in the region with the …xed population. Since the equilibrium must lie on the contours de…ned in Figures 2 to 3 , regional multinationals must arise if costs of FDI are not prohibitive.
We study next the e¤ects of size di¤erences within a region. Suppose that the two Northern countries are similar in size, while, in the South, country P 1 has a larger population than country P 2 . The two countries in each region share the same distribution of income. We are interested in examining how the division of population between P 1 and P 2 a¤ects the patterns of FDI and trade.
To this end, let N P 1 = N + and let N P 2 = N , where N = N R 1 = N R 2 and 0. This speci…cation makes the two regions equal in size for any value of . We begin from a situation in which, when = 0 (so that all countries have the same population size) there is only Northto-North and South-to-South FDI. Northern multinationals specialize in high-quality products and Southern multinationals specialize in low-quality products. For concreteness we focus on the case in which the costs of FDI are high, so that the equilibrium lies on segment AB of Figure 4 for high-quality products, and on segment DE of that …gure for low-quality products.
When = 0, as we showed in Section 5.1, the equilibrium conditions (12) and (13) determine the total numbers of high-quality and low-quality products, n H and n L , but the numbers of …rms with headquarters in each country is not determined. Firms that produce high-quality goods might be based either in R 1 or R 2 and …rms that produce low-quality goods might be headquartered in either P 1 or P 2 . In this equilibrium along AB of Figure 4 , (14) and (15) must be satis…ed; that is, the …rms in either region …nd it optimal to export to the opposite, but to serve the other country in their own region with sales from a foreign subsidiary. Now suppose that P 1 is slightly larger than P 2 ; i.e., > 0, but is small. Inasmuch as the two Southern countries share the same income distribution and the same prices, the movement of a representative sample of households from P 2 to P 1 has no a¤ect on aggregate demand and therefore no e¤ect on the incentives for …rms to enter as producers of low-quality goods in the South or as producers of high-quality goods in the North. A small increase in from = 0 leaves n H and n L unchanged, and the location of the …rms'headquarters in a given region remains indeterminate. 16 This argument requires, of course, that the asymmetry in population sizes creates no incentive for any …rm to alter its mode of serving any market. That is, …rms in each region must continue to prefer serving the opposite country in their own region with subsidiary sales and the markets in the opposite region with export sales despite the altered distribution of consumer location. This will indeed be the case provided that
where d k q is per capita demand for the product with quality q in country k in the equilibrium with equal-sized countries.
But note that a su¢ ciently large will cause (16) or (17) to be violated. As country P 1 grows large and P 2 small, either …rms headquartered in P 1 will prefer to serve the small market P 2 with exports, or …rms in the North will prefer to serve the large market in P 1 from a subsidiary located there. Suppose, for example, that (N + )
. Then Southern …rms in P 1 prefer to export to P 2 rather than to invest in a subsidiary there, and these …rms enjoy a cost advantage by dint of their large home market compared to …rms in P 2 .
Production of low-quality goods concentrates in the larger of the two Southern markets and …rms there export to all foreign markets. Figure 7 illustrates this in a parametrized example. 17 The horizontal axis shows the di¤erence in population size between the two countries in the Southern region. The …gure shows the number of …rms of the various types as a function of . For small enough di¤erences in size, the equilibrium has only regional multinationals. The curve labeled n s;P L shows the number of these producing low-quality products in the South and that labeled n s;R H shows the number producing high-quality products in the North. As consumers migrate from P 2 to P 1 , country P 1 attains a size that makes it pro…table to sell high-quality products from local subsidiaries there. A new type of Northern multinational emerges that has subsidiaries in the other market of the North and in P 1 , but not in P 2 . As P 1 continues to grow at the expense of P 2 , the number of such multinationals (labeled m s;R H ) increases while the number of regional multinationals declines. Eventually, it also becomes 1 6 This argument requires that the cost of producing a unit of output in a foreign subsidiary literally is the same as at home. If production near to headquarters generates even a tiny cost di¤erential, this would create a home-market advantage for the …rms headquartered in country P1 and this country would capture all of the producers of the low-quality good. 1 7 The parameters for this example are fL = 1; fH = 6; cL = 0:05; cH = 0:3; qL = 0:9; qH = 1:05; L = 0:6; optimal for …rms in P 2 to close their subsidiaries in P 1 and to instead serve the small market for low-quality products with export sales. The number of …rms located in P 1 that export to all foreign markets is denoted in the …gure by n x;P 1 L . For large enough di¤erences in size between P 1 and P 2 , there is no FDI by Northern or Southern …rms in the latter market.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have combined a product-quality view of the Linder hypothesis with a proximityconcentration view of …rms'decisions about how to serve their foreign markets. We conjectured that non-homothetic preferences and home-market e¤ects, which are known to a¤ect patterns of world trade, should in ‡uence patterns of foreign direct investment as well. The tradeo¤ between proximity and concentration implies that …rms are more likely to serve foreign markets from local production facilities when those markets are large. Non-homothetic preferences for vertically di¤erentiated products forge a connection between a country's income level and distribution and the mix of qualities it consumes. Accordingly, country income and product quality are bound to in ‡uence …rms' choices between foreign investment and international trade. We have extended the model in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) to allow for a¢ liate sales by multinational corporations and used the extended model to examine the circumstances under which …rms in a country will choose to serve some foreign markets by exports and others by subsidiary sales.
Our analysis establishes a systematic bias in FDI toward countries at a similar stage of development. In a simple setting that allows for both regional and cross-regional FDI, we …nd that North-North FDI or South-South FDI must occur in any equilibrium that features multinational investment. Moreover, if the income distribution in each Northern country dominates that in each Southern country, multinationals from the North specialize in producing high-quality products while multinationals from the South specialize in producing low-quality products. For given …xed costs of FDI, regional multinationals are more likely to arise the more disparate are the income distributions of the two regions. In keeping with the empirical evidence, the share of foreign a¢ liate sales in total sales falls with the di¤erence in per capita income between trading partners.
Our analysis provides an explanation for the fact that multinational sales are more responsive to income gaps than export sales, as documented by Brainard (1997) and others. In our model, FDI is more common across countries with similar income levels, because such countries tend to specialize their production of goods of similar quality. Our analysis also suggests a potential contributing factor in the recent surge in South-to-South FDI. For example, we …nd that the rise in multinational activity that naturally follows from a decline in the cost of establishing foreign subsidiaries has a distinctive pattern: …rms …rst locate foreign subsidiaries in markets that are similar to their home market before choosing to serve very di¤erent markets in this manner. Moreover, we …nd that smaller asymmetries in market size within regions are more conducive to regional FDI. Therefore, the convergence of China and India toward the income levels of other emerging-market countries might also account for part of the recent growth in South-to-South FDI.
